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A Legitimate Paradox: Neo-liberal Reform
and the Return of the State in Korea
DAVID HUNDT
This article examines the neo-liberal reforms that the Kim
government implemented in post-crisis Korea. It argues that by
embracing the reforms, the state, paradoxically, re-legitimised itself
in the national political economy. The process of enacting the
reforms completed the power shift from a collusive state–chaebol
alliance towards a new alliance based on a more populist social
contract – but one that nonetheless generally conformed to the
tenets of neo-liberalism. Kim and his closest associates identiﬁed the
malpractices of the chaebols as the main cause of the crisis, so
reforming the chaebols would be the key to economic recovery.
Combining populism and neo-liberalism, they drew on support from
both domestic and international sources to rein in, rather than
nurture, the chaebols.
I . INTRODUCTION
This article investigates the role of the Korean1 state in the post-crisis era,
particularly in relation to its stewardship of the neo-liberal reforms required
as a condition of the IMF loan package. It argues that the process of neo-
liberal reform has contributed to a reformulation of power relativities in the
national political economy, but contrary to the expectations of some, state
elites – particularly the president and his senior ministers – appeared to be the
main beneﬁciaries. The paradox that emerges is that neo-liberal reforms do
not necessarily weaken the inﬂuence of state elites; the case of Korea
indicates that some elites grasped an opportunity to regain leadership of the
economic policy-making agenda.
The pro-reform state elites have followed a different logic to that of earlier
periods of industrialisation, enthusiastically pursuing the liberalisation of
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ﬁnancial markets and industrial restructuring while also implementing the
framework for a rudimentary welfare state, instead of focusing on incentives
for corporate investment. Rather than sounding the death knell for the state,
the post-crisis period has witnessed the ongoing transformation of what E.M.
Kim [1997] and Henderson [1993] term a developmentalist, ‘plan-rational’
state to a ‘market-rational’ one. While economic development continues to be
its main priority, the state’s modus operandi has changed considerably.
Despite strong opposition from the chaebols,2 the state has reinvented itself
as the facilitator of ﬁnancial and industrial restructuring.
This article advances the propositions outlined above through a range of
inter-related arguments. First, it is argued that in a maturing and increasingly
sophisticated economy, the state needed support from both domestic and
international actors to regain control of the policy-making agenda. This
entailed both appeals to populism and the adoption of neo-liberal reform.
There was a new social contract whose primary focus would be on the
welfare of the national economy, even if that necessitated anti-chaebol
measures or the involvement of foreign capital – notions anathema to the
traditional Korean developmental paradigm. Next the article notes that the
process of neo-liberal reform began well before the outbreak of the crisis, and
that a signiﬁcant portion of the impetus for reform came from Korean
political and economic elites rather than external actors such as the IMF. The
crisis was an opportunity to intensify earlier reform measures. Further, the
state’s success in re-legitimating itself was in at least in part due to the
support of the public, who were vehemently opposed to the chaebols’
continued dominance of the economy. The strong anti-chaebol sentiment
shared by the Kim government and the public resulted in attempts to rein in,
rather than nurture, the chaebols. Thus, the breakdown of the traditional
alliance between the state and business, and the transition to the new social
contract, are features of the post-crisis period. The article concludes by
brieﬂy exploring some implications of these developments.
I I . THE STATE IN THE PRE-CRISIS PERIOD
This section provides a brief sketch of the Korean ‘developmental’ state prior
to the 1990s – a period in which neo-liberal reform was pursued more
extensively than is often acknowledged. The article argues that the Korean
state lost its sense of developmental purpose – and legitimacy – during the
1980s; thus the attainment of a new sense of purpose was all the more
signiﬁcant in the post-crisis period.
In the literature devoted to Korea’s modernisation, a common theme has
been that the developmental state had the unique ability to master market
forces and harness them for industrialisation. Wade [1990] for instance
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claims that in a ‘governed market’, the state steered investment into priority
sectors; this would not have occurred under purely free market conditions,
where investment decisions are almost entirely the remit of the private sector.
According to Amsden [1990: 16], a judicious combination of incentives and
disincentives (‘support and discipline’) produced the optimal level of
competition amongst the chaebols while also ensuring that the needs of the
wider economy were met by stimulating trade and investment. In a similar
manner Kim Yong Hwan, a policy-maker during the early phases of
industrialisation, writes of the state’s stewardship of the heavy and chemical
industry drive in the 1970s that ‘the policy would deliver the optimal results
in all perspectives – that is, the mutually disciplining and supporting
relationship between economic rationalisation and technological rationalisa-
tion’ [Y.H. Kim 2002: 116]. That is, the state ‘got the prices wrong’ in order
to make particular industries, such as automobiles, steel and shipbuilding,
proﬁtable [Amsden, 1989].
Nonetheless, the developmental state model depicted above faced
opposition from several quarters, starting in the 1980s. First, the US
intensiﬁed efforts to open the product and ﬁnancial markets of Korea and
Japan once these countries attained relative prosperity and with the waning of
the Cold War in Asia [see Cumings, 1998]. Also opposed to state-led
development were the international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs), especially the
IMF. The IFIs were the main instruments available for resolving economic
crises in Latin America in the 1980s and again in 1994–95. Equally
important, the IFIs’ ‘prescriptions’ for recovery drew chieﬂy upon the
‘Washington consensus’, which sought to eliminate the statist development
paradigm in developing countries, and to impress upon them the beneﬁts of
shifting to a market-based economy [Williamson, 2000: 252].3
The anti-statist rhetoric emanating from the IFIs and Western governments
began to manifest itself within Korea in the form of pro-reform policy-
makers who called for the reduction or abolition of many of the traditional
elements of the developmental state. Industrial policy, which illustrated most
clearly the tendency of the developmental state to involve itself in micro-
level decisions, was anathema to advocates of neo-liberal reform. Crucially,
the 1980s also witnessed the democratisation of the Korean body-politic, and
some features of the military–authoritarian state were in the process of
reform. Most notably, from the viewpoint of this article, the Economic
Planning Board (EPB) – whose ranks included numerous US-educated
reformers – was subsumed into the Ministry of Finance and Economy
(MOFE), traditionally a stronghold of bureaucrats who advocated a greater
role for the state [J.-H. Kim 2000]. This symbolic change resulted in statist
policy instruments being largely abandoned by the early 1990s, signiﬁcantly
reducing the state’s capacity to intervene in the economy. This development
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was accompanied by a concomitant rise in the inﬂuence of the chaebols
[Chang, 1998b].
This reduction in the inﬂuence of the state – and increase in that of the
chaebols – amounted to the de-legitimation of the state’s role in the national
economy. Legitimacy, according to Seabrooke [2002: 23], ‘involves the
contestation of power between state and society’. This contestation does not
merely involve the attainment, use and retention of resources: it also entails
the shaping of the policy agenda and the ascription of an ‘appropriate’ role to
the state. The norms and material interests of society inﬂuence the
contestation of power, and thus determine the degree of legitimacy of the
state at a given point in time [Seabrooke, 2002: 2–3]. Likewise, this article
contends that the dominance of the neo-liberal paradigm, both domestically
and within the IFIs and Western governments, assisted proponents of reform
in the battle for ideas about the role of the Korean state. In particular, the
proponents of reform – who included the IMF, the US government, the
chaebols and, increasingly, the chieﬂy US-educated bureaucrats, arguing that
the state should be relegated to a supervisory role, through which it would
facilitate the development of the economy as a whole, rather than be involved
in sectoral industrial policies [Weiss, 2003].
State institutions, it has been claimed, are often ‘time-limited in their
effectiveness’. Institutional arrangements undergo ‘a process of growth and
decay . . . some of the positive synergies that occurred during a phase of
expansion can turn negative under changing historical circumstances’ [Block,
1986: 182]. In short, the institutions that serve society at one point in time
may need to be reformed to retain their effectiveness. As the case of Korea in
the post-crisis period demonstrates, it was possible for the state to regain
legitimacy by adopting the dominant contemporary ideology (neo-liberal-
ism), and altering its institutional form accordingly. Speciﬁcally, state leaders
played an active role in the resolution of the ﬁnancial crisis of late 1997. Kim
Dae-jung and his chief ministers facilitated neo-liberal reform in order to re-
legitimise their position in the national political economy, from which they
would be able to continue exercising a signiﬁcant degree of inﬂuence on the
policy-making agenda.
I I I . THE REFORM PACKAGE
This section of the article outlines the reform agenda that the Kim
government negotiated with the IMF in return for a loan of sufﬁcient scale
to cover Korea’s short-term debts. What should be noted, however, is that the
government did not wholly oppose these reforms: indeed, the measures that
were pursued largely coincided with the policies that incoming President Kim
Dae-jung had long championed. As will be discussed further, Kim and senior
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ofﬁcials became more than just willing accomplices to the IMF during the
crisis; they oversaw a comprehensive attempt to wrest control of the national
economy back from the chaebols, which were widely blamed for causing the
crisis in the ﬁrst place.
First, the government tightened ﬁscal and monetary policies in order to
reduce inﬂation and the budget deﬁcit. Taxes were raised, and funds diverted
from defence to welfare, in preparation for the anticipated increase in
unemployment [Park, 2002]. Second, the government reorganised the
functions of the state. Launched with the goal of creating a ‘smaller but
more efﬁcient’ government, the re-organisation transferred the functions of
some ministries to local governments and lower-level civil servants,
furthering the efforts of the previous government to democratise the state
apparatus [No, Lee et al., 2002: 380–81]. Other aims of public sector reform
were a reduction in the size of the public sector workforce, the privatisation
of state-owned enterprises, the introduction of ‘performance-based’ pay and
employment systems for public servants, and the delegation of more control
over economic policy-making to the executive and prime minister [E.M. Kim,
1999: 43–46; Na, 2003: 298].
A third plank of the agenda was labour market reform, since the IMF
considered ‘ﬂexibility’ to be vital if industrial restructuring was to proceed. It
was argued that some jobs would inevitably be lost during the restructuring of
the chaebols. The ‘Tripartite Commission on Industrial Relations’, formed in
January 1998 with the goal of improving ﬂexibility, resulted in the major
trade union federations agreeing to layoffs in ‘unavoidable’ circumstances
[S.-J. Kim, 1998: 135]. In return, unions were granted permission to engage
in political activities and to extend their coverage to the public service and
education [Park and Park, 2000: 86]. While the revision of the Labour
Relations Law in March 1997 had resulted in trade unions acceding to the
notion of limited job security in return for greater freedoms for union activity
[No, Lee et al., 2002: 376–77], the IMF reforms removed almost entirely the
expectation of job security. The government also established a $4.4 billion
fund to compensate for job losses resulting from restructuring. Another
outcome of the tripartite talks was the legalisation of ‘dispatch centres’,
which were responsible for employing workers on short-term contracts for
less than regular wages [Kwon and O’Donnell, 1999: 279].
Fourthly, ﬁnancial sector reform was pursued, the main goal of which was
to increase the level of competition among ﬁnancial institutions. Introducing
foreign competition to the ﬁnancial sector would, the IMF claimed, raise the
overall performance of the sector and encourage the closure of insolvent
institutions. At the same time, the ﬁnancial condition of many institutions
was impaired by non-performing loans, so their overall performance was
poor. After initiating a process of rationalisation, the government re-
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capitalised the surviving institutions. The net effect of these changes, it was
claimed, would be a more competitive, better-capitalised and market-oriented
ﬁnancial sector [Choong, 2001: 461; Haggard, 2000: 149]. The indepen-
dence of ﬁnancial supervisory agencies was also enhanced, with the IMF
advising the government to grant full independence to the Bank of Korea,
which it had not hitherto enjoyed. A new supervisory agency, the Financial
Securities Commission (FSC), would complement the newly independent
central bank [S.-J. Kim, 1998: 131; Park, 2002: 65].
Finally, the reforms targeted the management of the chaebols (governance)
and their production processes (restructuring). Improvements to corporate
governance would involve the ‘ﬁve-plus-three’ principles. The initial ﬁve
principles were: greater transparency, better accounting and reporting, greater
accountability by owner-managers, abolition of mutual guarantees among
chaebol afﬁliates, and a streamlining of the chaebols’ operations. The
government later announced additional measures to improve corporate
governance. Financial market supervisory agencies were to more rigorously
oversee the chaebols’ control of non-bank ﬁnancial institutions (NBFIs), a
source of much of their credit, as well as inter-subsidiary investments. In
addition, illicit collaboration was to be dissuaded by preventing ‘irregular
inheritances’ and gift giving among chaebol owners [Mo and Moon, 2003:
128–32].
To emphasise the need for industrial restructuring, the IMF argued that
one of the main causes of the crisis was low proﬁtability, which in turn
was the result of over-capacity and excessive investment in industries such
as shipbuilding, automobiles, electronics and semiconductors. In the words
of Kim’s ﬁrst Minister for Finance and Economy Lee Kyu-seong,
‘Companies, in the past, had a ﬁnger in every pie and concentrated on
expanding their power quantitatively but now that kind of indiscriminate
expansion is instead acting as a burden’ [Song, 1999: 97]. The proposed
remedy to this problem was the elimination of surplus production capacity,
in the form of the outright shutdown of plant and equipment, asset swaps
between chaebols in similar industries (‘big deals’), as well as ‘workout
programs’, which involved an injection of public funds to re-capitalise the
chaebols in return for the elimination to the practice of mutual debt
guarantees between chaebol afﬁliates [Cumings, 1998: 63–64; Choi, 2002:
268; Shin, 2000: 191–94].
IV. LEARNING TO LOVE THE IMF?
The reforms had an all-pervading effect on the Korean economy. Some
commentators have referred to the IMF reforms as a ‘mistake’ imposed on an
unwilling country under crisis conditions. Feldstein [1998], for instance,
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chides the IMF for overstepping the mark during the crisis by insisting that
loan recipients undergo major structural and institutional change. Radelet and
Sachs [1998: 18–20], meanwhile, claim that macro policies were generally
sound and that the crisis was attributable mainly to the destabilisation of
international ﬁnancial markets due to investor panic. The response to the
crisis should have been more moderate, it is argued; instead of over-reacting
and requesting wide-ranging institutional reform [Wade, 1998], the IMF
should have calmed markets and allowed the crisis countries to resume
growth while implementing regulatory reforms that would have helped their
ﬁnancial systems resist sudden shifts in capital ﬂows.
The purpose of this article, however, is not to assess the severity of the
reform package. Bustelo [2000] performs that task adequately. Instead, it is
argued here that to castigate the IMF for the reforms is to ignore the point that
Korean ofﬁcials were not only highly complicit in the implementation of the
reforms; they were more than willing to accept the chance to refashion the
national political economy in line with the reforms. Even prominent
defenders of the statist paradigm such as Chang [1998a, 1998b] and Chang,
Park and Yoo [1998] note that the IMF reforms were only an extension of the
Kim Yong-sam (1993–98) government’s efforts to roll back the develop-
mental state’s most characteristic elements such as restrictions on duplicate
investment – which, as will be seen later in this article, were not enforced
when Samsung entered the car industry. According to these scholars, the
crisis could be attributed more to policy failure by the Kim Yong-sam
government than structural factors such as external pressure from the US.
Accordingly, it is pertinent to note that Kim Dae-jung and his senior
economic ministers consistently articulated a tough policy on chaebol reform,
calling for a complete overhaul of the extant model of state–business
relations. In the view of Kim’s appointee as head of the Bank of Korea, ‘we
should have transformed quickly in the early 1980s . . . we basically failed in
the transition to a new market economy system’ [Bu and Jang, 1998: 221].
Kim’s then ﬁnance minister Kang Bong-gyun summarised the government’s
approach to economic policy as ‘getting rid of the factors that have prevented
the market mechanism from working over the past few decades’ [Kwon,
2000: 76]. Even before taking ofﬁce, Kim indicated that the privileges
offered by previous regimes would be withdrawn. At a press conference on
the day after his election, Kim [1997] enunciated his preference for a market
economy, claiming that his government would ‘totally rescue all ﬁrms from
the chains of power and from the protection of power . . . only ﬁrms that adapt
to the market economy and are victorious in global competition will survive’.
According to one insider, Kim would have pursued the sort of reforms that
the IMF had demanded even if the ﬁnancial crisis had not occurred: ‘When
President Kim was running for ofﬁce, he once said in private ‘‘it’s worked out
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for the best’’ after the IMF demanded that the chaebols be reformed’ [Yun,
1999: 272]. That is, the president-elect believed that reckless investment on
the part of the chaebols had imperilled not only the conglomerates but also
the entire national economy. Ending this outdated system, with its high
associated social and political costs, would be a high priority.
Lee Kyu-seong claimed that previous governments and the chaebols were
jointly responsible for the crisis – a claim that would be repeatedly heard as
the post-crisis period wore on. In his view, the crisis was attributable to the
accumulated ills of an ‘authoritarian political–bureaucratic economy
(gwanchi gyeongje)’, which Lee claimed delayed the development of
democracy and a functioning market economy; a faulty ‘globalisation’
policy, which had opened ﬁnancial markets but not introduced the market
principles of responsibility and punishment; and the failure of the chaebols to
restructure in response to the changing conditions of the global economy
[K.-H. Kim, 1998: 169–70]. For Kim Dae-jung’s economic team, then,
reform was inevitable. As Lee commented elsewhere, ‘there isn’t really any
response apart from the policies prescribed by the IMF’ [Song, 1999: 93].
If the political economy were altered in the ways that the incoming
government was proposing, it would have represented a signiﬁcant change
from the uniquely Korean situation of the past, when ﬁrms with a weak
capital base grew on the basis of government favours and close ties with
political leaders [Yoon, Kim and Lee, 2003: 358–59]. This system, referred to
as jeonggyeong yuchak in Korean, is precisely the set of arrangements that
Kim Dae-jung’s government sought to bring to end through the reform drive
after the crisis.
While it is possible to argue that the raison d’eˆtre of the Korean state has
changed markedly in the wake of the neo-liberal reforms, this article contends
that the crisis and reforms expedited changes that were already underway.
Crucial support for a change to the statist paradigm came from both the US-
trained technocrats and the Kim Yong-sam government which came to power
in 1993. This trend became even more apparent with the inauguration of Kim
Dae-jung as president. Gradually, the ideological and institutional bases of
strategic intervention in the political economy eroded, resulting in a form of
liberalisation that sought to weaken the developmental role of the state [Weiss
and Hobson, 2000: 62].
To illustrate this change in the role of the state, this article refers to what
E.M. Kim [1997] describes as the shift from a ‘comprehensive’ to a
‘limited’ developmental state. According to Kim, a comprehensive
developmental state (CDS) is ‘plan-rational’ rather than ‘market-rational’,
meaning that the state focuses on development rather than regulation. The
CDS, Kim claims, caters to the economy’s long-term interests by
supporting the private sector during its infancy. As the sophistication of
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the economy increases however, it is more difﬁcult for the state to perform
these tasks, because ﬁrms seek greater autonomy from the state. Instead, the
state plays a supervisory and regulatory role, transforming in the process
from being ‘pro-business’ to ‘pro-market’. In other words, the structural
transformation of the economy determines the role of the state. This implies
that the state will be less concerned about promoting the interests of
speciﬁc ﬁrms (as was the case in the past); instead, the interests of the
economy as a whole become paramount. By acting to further these broad
interests the state is able to regain legitimacy as a participant in the political
economy: that is, because it is seen to pursue national rather than sectoral
interests.
In the Korean context, the changing role of the state can ﬁrst be illustrated
by the manner in which the state was able to regenerate the conﬁdence of
international lenders on behalf of the chaebols by linking domestic and
international capital markets. For instance, it brought liquidity back into the
ﬁnancial system by agreeing to the IMF reforms in return for a resumption in
lending from international ﬁnancial institutions [Haggard, Lim and Kim
(HLK), 2003: 318]. In a narrower sense, the state’s regaining of legitimacy,
and its exploitation of its enhanced structural power (along with the
diminution of that of the chaebols) can be detected in the way in which the
government oversaw the process of chaebol restructuring, which symbolised
a break from the past – the passing, or at least radical reorganisation, of the
chaebol system.
The next section of this article will provide more speciﬁc examples of
how the Kim government implemented its agenda for a market economy
in the post-crisis period. In particular, it will concentrate on two cases
where the state reined in the power of the chaebols. In the ﬁrst, the
government sought to restructure a chaebol that was widely perceived to
be poorly run (Daewoo) in order to demonstrate that Korea was committed
to reform. The second case highlights the government’s efforts to reduce
excess capacity in particular industries by encouraging mergers and asset
swaps (the proposed big deals involving Samsung Motor). This latter case
also illustrates the visceral reaction of the chaebols to the reform agenda.
V. CHAEBOL REFORM: DAEWOO AND SAMSUNG
A clear indication that the developmental alliance between the state and the
chaebols had changed was the handling of the Daewoo Group’s bankruptcy in
August 1999. Hitherto, the state had been reluctant to allow chaebols of
Daewoo’s scale to collapse due to the potential social and economic fallout.
The Daewoo Group represented a particularly egregious case of corporate
proﬂigacy, even by the standards of the chaebols, with the group’s owners
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resorting to ‘creative’ accounting practices such as revaluing assets,
accessing funds through NBFIs and issuing more equity [D.G. Lee, 2003;
Park, 2002: 76]. Daewoo was the ‘Korean model’ writ small: it relied
particularly heavily on overseas borrowing to fund its expansion, and its
ﬁnancial structure was weaker than most groups. A Seoul-based foreign
banker was quoted as saying: ‘The Daewoo Group did not have a project
within the group that was earning money . . . Naturally, it was forced to rely
on foreign loans . . . Daewoo’s troubles with foreign ﬁnancial institutions
have worsened its ﬁnancial woes’ [Yun, 1999: 267].
The government’s willingness publicly to criticise the group’s slow
progress in restructuring heightened Daewoo’s predicament. Foreign
investors on the lookout for joint venture partners in Korea took the
government’s negative prognosis of Daewoo’s restructuring proposals as a
suggestion that the group was unlikely to receive new capital injections on
favourable terms, and that it might even be broken up [C.-H. Lee, 1999: 262].
According to one government ofﬁcial, Daewoo was the least active chaebol
in putting forward a proposal to improve its own ﬁnancial position, and it
seemed to misread the government’s determination to proceed with
restructuring. Soon after the crisis, a number of groups published schedules
to reduce their debt-to-equity ratios below the government’s target of 200 per
cent. Daewoo, in contrast, increased its debt in this period, with the total
reaching 59.9 trillion won (about $51 billion) at the end of 1998 – 17.1
trillion won more than the previous year [Yun, 1999: 268–72]. It took
Daewoo until early 1999 to realise that its survival was at stake. The
government’s warnings were far from subtle on occasions: the chairman of
the FSC (and later ﬁnance minister), Lee Hun-jai, pointedly stated that
Daewoo’s leadership would be removed if restructuring did not proceed in a
timely manner. On 19 April of that year, Daewoo’s leadership announced a
proposal to restructure itself that appeared to reﬂect all the government’s
demands – unlike its earlier attempts [Lim, 1999: 219–20].
It is likely that the government fully understood the salutary effect that
Daewoo’s bankruptcy would have on similarly recalcitrant chaebol owners.
Thus, while the government would be both unlikely and unwilling to bear the
consequences of a series of collapses on the same scale as Daewoo, it might
have allowed a small number of other chaebols to go bankrupt. Other chaebol
owners, not wanting to imperil the survival of their groups, heeded the
lessons of Daewoo and made more substantive efforts to restructure their
operations: by the end of 2000, 17 out of the top 30 chaebols had entered
receivership or had undergone restructuring processes such as workouts [Mo
and Moon, 2003: 131–36].
The Daewoo case illustrates the Kim government’s pursuit of an initial
goal of reform: the lowering of debt levels, which had great symbolic value
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given the notoriously high levels of borrowing of the chaebols. Samsung
Motor, meanwhile, shows how the chaebols responded to attempts to change
other aspects of the chaebol system: the governance structures of Korean
business groups, especially cross-subsidisation [Lim, 1999: 224]. The peak
business lobby, the Federation of Korean Industry (FKI) defended this system
by arguing that the chaebols – and the economy – grew rapidly by using
proﬁtable business units to subsidise the development of new, less proﬁtable
ones. The chaebols claimed that without this ‘convoy system of business
(seondansik gyeong-yeong)’, which necessarily tied the fortunes of an entire
business group together, it would not have been possible to invest resources
in new industries [C.-H. Lee, 1999: 257].
In the case of Samsung, the electronics division had acted as the group’s
capital stream in the 1980s and 1990s, and provided the funds to enter the car
industry. However a collapse in the price of semiconductors and electrical
goods in 1995 and 1996 was to have an adverse effect on the ﬁnancial
structure of the entire group, especially in the wake of the cut-off of
international lending during the ﬁnancial crisis. The Kim Dae-jung
government’s prognosis of the ‘chaebol problem’ was that the practice of
cross-subsidisation under the convoy system resulted in unproﬁtable business
units dragging down entire chaebols and ultimately the national economy
[H.-K. Kim, 1998: 174]. To the government, the Samsung case was a typical
example of a proﬁtable activity (electronics) subsidising an unproﬁtable one
(cars) in an industry that suffered from overcapacity. Even worse, in the eyes
of the Kim government, Samsung indicated an interest in taking over Kia, the
fourth-biggest carmaker, which had collapsed in 1997 with debts totalling
12.8 trillion won. The government sought to dispose of Kia by selling it to
foreign interests, because allowing one of the other established carmakers
(Hyundai, Daewoo and Ssangyeong) to take over Kia would only perpetuate
the overcapacity problem. Samsung Motor, which only began production in
1998 after spending billions of dollars building a car plant, applied to take
over Kia; its rationale was that assuming Kia’s production capacity would
ensure Samsung’s survival in the post-crisis period. The perpetuation of this
type of logic – the ‘too big to fail’ mentality – was precisely what the
government sought to avoid. It instead courted foreign interests without
success during 1998 and the ﬁrst half of 1999, while at the same time
proposing that Samsung, as the newest entrant and most unproﬁtable
producer, merge with Daewoo (whose group, as mentioned earlier, faced
problems of its own). This proposal came to naught, as Samsung and Daewoo
failed to agree on the terms of a merger. Samsung instead declared its motor
division bankrupt on 30 June of that year, having produced only a small
number of vehicles [Yu, 1999: 256–57]. It would later be revived in
partnership with Renault.
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Thus the Samsung case exempliﬁes the intent of the Kim government to
rationalise industrial sectors that it perceived to be uncompetitive, despite its
public pronouncements that the chaebols should entirely determine asset
swaps and mergers [Song, 1999: 96]. Kang Bong-gyun hinted that reforming,
not abolishing, the chaebol system was the goal of the reform agenda: ‘The
government doesn’t want the chaebols to be broken up; it wants ‘‘changed
chaebols’’’ [Kwon, 2000: 67]. Even if that involved the sale of key industrial
assets to foreign interests, or their outright disposal, the government was
intent on reform. Not only did ministers claim that foreign capital would
accelerate the reforms launched in 1997, some in the government thought that
FDI was essential if Korean ﬁnancial institutions and conglomerates were to
regain international competitiveness in the medium-to-long term [The
Economist, 2002: 79; H.-K. Kim, 1998: 176]. Nonetheless, the Samsung
Group, unlike Daewoo, was strong enough in its entirety to avoid being
broken up. It is also worth noting that Samsung, despite its costly and ill-
advised venture into the car industry, was generally better managed than
Daewoo, so the loss of an industrial conglomerate such as Samsung would
patently not be in the interests of the national economy. This may explain the
differences between the government’s handling of each case.
VI . THE END OF THE AFFAIR?
The Samsung case also showed that the chaebols were not powerless in their
response to the reforms in the post-crisis era. Despite ceding a prized asset –
its car-making unit, for which group chairman and chief shareholder Lee
Keun-Hee had a personal, longstanding passion – Samsung avoided being
dismembered like Daewoo. Indeed, it received a handsome reward in return
for leaving the car industry: the group was given permission to list Samsung
Life Insurance publicly at a price that delivered massive windfall gains to Lee
and other key shareholders [Yu, 1999: 258–59]. Nonetheless, the government
regained an inﬂuential position in the national political economy in the post-
crisis period by harnessing the support of both domestic and external actors,
and this entailed an overtly hostile approach to the chaebols, as illustrated in
the Daewoo and Samsung cases. Now less dependent on the chaebols for its
political survival, the state altered its policy mix to reﬂect the interests of a
wider group of societal actors [HLK, 2003: 311], while faithfully
implementing the neo-liberal reform agenda.
In order to muster support from the Korean public, the state reverted to a
populist stance, that involved not just casting the chaebols as the villain in the
piece, but also casting itself as a neutral, responsible, necessary – and thus
legitimate – actor in the national economy. Despite expectations in some
quarters that Kim Dae-jung would ﬁnd common cause with trade unions, his
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natural constituency was the middle classes; the Tripartite Commission
notwithstanding, the government’s political strategy was to reach over the
heads of the unions and directly to the public for support. In one of his ﬁrst
public statements after winning the December 1997 election, the president
stated that job losses would be inevitable. As Lee Kyu-seong would later
comment, ‘I think that the public must understand that reducing employment
by 10–20 per cent through restructuring is a way to prevent a situation where
100 per cent of jobs are lost to unemployment in the future’ [Song, 1999: 91].
The middle classes, who were less likely to be directly affected by layoffs,
had traditionally distrusted trade unions, and felt that militancy was
inappropriate during a national crisis. Moreover, this section of the public
was wary of any party that appeared to share the chaebols’ opposition to
reform. The state capitalised on the anti-chaebol sentiment to paint striking
workers as anti-reform, and by implication, as working in the interests of the
chaebols and against those of the country as a whole.
The chaebols responded to the charge that they, and by implication the
chaebol system, were responsible for the crisis with a propaganda offensive
of their own. For example Daewoo chairman Kim Woo Choong claimed in a
speech soon after the crisis broke out that there was nothing wrong with the
chaebol system: ‘If the big business system is not preserved, in the twenty-
ﬁrst century our country’s capitalist system will be in danger’ [Yun, 1999:
274]. In a separate presentation, he blamed external forces for the crisis,
arguing that:
advanced countries intend to take over our domestic market and
eliminate Korean big business, who are their competitors. . . Despite the
creation of large ﬁrms through M&As being a recent trend amongst the
world’s companies, only in our country is big business the subject of
criticism. . . it is wrong to unconditionally condemn big business as the
culprit of the economic crisis’ [Yun, 1999: 274].
Former FKI president Sohn Byung-doo reinforced the message that the
chaebols were not solely responsible for the crisis, saying ‘wasn’t the main
cause [of the crisis] sheeted home to just the excessive investments of the
chaebols? . . .There is a clear responsibility on the chaebols but they were
not the [sole] culprits’. He claimed that the chaebols have contributed
signiﬁcantly to the advanced industrial society that is modern Korea:
‘Aren’t ﬁrms the driving force behind the creation of national wealth?
. . .Our society has accepted the free market economy system and enjoyed
its beneﬁts but we don’t seem to really understand its strengths and
blessings’ [N. Lee, 2003: 223]. Likewise, an FKI advisor warned the
government not to adopt a populist stance, arguing that ‘The government is
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trying to pursue chaebol reform by exposing the immorality of the chaebols
and [presenting] a negative image of their leaders. If the government . . .
denounces the chaebols as the object for reform, it might be popular in the
beginning but it will ultimately be a meaningless policy’ [C.-H. Lee, 1999:
256–57]. The FKI would later warn that the strength of anti-business
sentiment, which has long permeated Korean society due to the Confucian
disdain for entrepreneurship, is detrimental to the normal operations of
business [Seo, 2004].
The mutual antagonism between the government and business in the
Daewoo and Samsung cases has resulted in less cooperation in the post-
crisis period – a development of historical signiﬁcance given that close
collaboration between these parties has been a hallmark of the Korean
model of development. The chaebols have been particularly disturbed by
the government’s taking unilateral action – that is, its reassertion of
leadership in respect to the policy agenda. Whereas in previous decades
the chaebols had substantial input into the policy-making process, their
leaders began to complain that they were unable to respond to the
government’s reform agenda because they were unsure of its aim and
extent, and that they had no clear line of communication with the
government. To the chaebols, ‘talks’ were merely meant to make ofﬁcial
the government’s policy, so there was no sense of mutual trust [Y.-G. Kim,
1999].
Further, the chaebols felt that the government was interfering in matters
that should be left to the private sector to decide, most notably decisions
about mergers and asset swaps. Indeed, the Kim government’s three senior
economic ofﬁcials have claimed the right to intervene selectively. It is the
duty of the government to provide leadership in cases where, in the words
of Kang Bong-gyun, ‘autonomously managed systems and traditions are not
in place’ [Kwon, 2000: 77], such as the selection of a new FKI chairman to
replace Kim Woo Choong, who resigned following the collapse of Daewoo.
Similarly, Lee Hun-jai believes in principle that market forces should
operate, but only on the pre-condition that the market operates smoothly
[H.-K. Kim, 1998: 176]. The Kim government appropriated the right to
decide when this was the case. And Lee Kyu-seong claims that it is
inappropriate for the state to interfere illegally in the restructuring process
or in forcing banks to raise interest rates, but ‘we are in a crisis situation
where the autonomous market mechanism is broken, so it is impossible to
ﬂy with instruments and we have no choice but to rely on sight’ [K.-H.
Kim, 1998: 172]. The interventionist streak evident in these comments
indicates that some elements of the Korean developmental state remain
alongside the neo-liberal reform agenda – a combination unsettling for the
chaebols.
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The message of the chaebols in the post-crisis era was that the
government could not be trusted: not only were the policies it announced
detrimental to the national economy, the chaebols claimed; the government
was also determined to destroy the chaebol system, which had served Korea
well. An advisor to the FKI said that despite the myriad rationales provided
for chaebol reform, they amounted to a project that would end the chaebol
system as we know it: ‘The government claims to be in favour of chaebol
reform, not the break up of the chaebols. However if all the policies that the
government has suggested are implemented, the chaebols will be broken up
. . . the government is just using the expression of reform’ [C.-H. Lee, 1999:
254]. Trust was also eroded due to broken promises. Sohn Byung-doo
complained that the government’s approach to the big deal process was
seriously ﬂawed, with few of the promises initially made being kept. For
instance, the government, Sohn claimed, promised a wide range of taxation
and ﬁnancial assistance to the chaebols, as well as support for the chaebols’
efforts to downsize their workforces. ‘But once things started, the
government abrogated responsibility for [this] model of assistance, and
they said that credit would be decided through a conference with the
ﬁnancial delegation, and they kept on dragging their feet’ [N. Lee, 2003:
226].
Further, the chaebols resented the Kim government’s use of coercive
measures, such as the setting of timetables for compliance with restructuring;
the government threatened to investigate non-compliers on the grounds of
crimes such as selling shares illegally and ﬁxing the price of shares [Lim,
1999: 225]. Ofﬁcials such as Kang Bong-gyun came in for strong criticism
from the FKI for underhand tactics: ‘although the government talks about
negotiations, it interferes through telephone messages and directives. Since
there is potential for problems to develop in the future, they don’t want to
document anything [now]’. The government also stood accused of
intimidating business leaders: ‘is it negotiating to haul business leaders in
front of the president and tell them to sign an agreement? . . .The leaders of
the top-ﬁve chaebols are not saying anything and trembling in front of the
president; would they even dream of resisting? This is close to a reign of
terror’ [C.-H. Lee, 1999: 255–56].
VI I . CONCLUSION
This article has focused on the way in which the IMF reforms represented an
opportunity for political and economic elites within the Kim government to
strengthen their standing vis-a`-vis other actors, especially the chaebols. The
state proved to be capable of facilitating the process of industrial and
ﬁnancial restructuring that was required as a condition for the emergency
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loans. As such, the state operated in accordance to a markedly different
template – part populism, part neo-liberalism – to that of the early stages of
economic development.
Since the crisis, the success of the reforms – and the state’s bid to regain
legitimacy in the political economy – also beneﬁted from the Kim
government’s ability to capitalise on the public’s sense of outrage at the
excesses of the chaebols and their culpability in the outbreak of the crisis.
That is, the legitimacy that was restored to the state stemmed from two
sources: the external support of the US and the IFIs for implementing the
neo-liberal agenda, and also domestic groups other than the chaebols. The
government was more than willing to capitalise on the perception that the
chaebols were responsible for bringing the economic crisis to the country due
to their reckless lending and expansion. Thus the state gained public support
for reining in, rather than nurturing, the chaebols – in contrast to the initial
stages of economic development.
Yet the latent capacity of the chaebols to inﬂuence policy-making due to
their structural position in the economy should not be underestimated. The
observation has been made that the ‘too big to fail’ mentality has largely –
perhaps even totally – disappeared in the wake of the collapse of Daewoo and
several smaller chaebols [Na, 2003: 297–98; Song, 1999: 97; Yun, 1999:
274]. The danger remains that investment will not return to previous levels,
with deleterious effects on production and employment. Demand is weak, and
the rate of credit delinquency is hitting new highs, accentuating the need for
new investment [C.-S. Lee, 2004]. Business leaders have warned that the
measures proffered by the government in the post-crisis period would not
deliver a recovery in investment; the chaebols would have preferred new
injections of capital rather than coercive restructuring [N. Lee, 2003: 226]. It
remains to be seen whether Korean ﬁrms’ recent surge in foreign investment
– especially in China – continues, or whether the state is capable of inducing
renewed investment in the domestic economy.
There are also concerns that the relaxation of barriers to foreign investment
has weakened the long-term growth potential of the economy. The
penetration of foreign capital has been far from insigniﬁcant: as at early
2002, foreigners owned 36.2 per cent of listed stock in Korea, and a majority
of shares in leading ﬁrms such as Samsung Electronics, POSCO and Hyundai
Motors [Crotty and Lee, 2002: 673–76]. Others [such as Yun, 2003: 237–39]
agree with the government’s rationale for inducing investment – that it has
beneﬁted Korea by introducing new technology and managerial practices,
and has thus facilitated the process of restructuring the chaebols. Foreign
capital has even challenged the chaebols’ practice of cross-subsidisation in
the courts, as the case of Sovereign Asset Management and SK Corp has
illustrated [The Economist, 2004: 60–61].
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The state sought a renewed mandate in the post-crisis period, and it played
a vital role in Korea’s economic recovery, as this article has noted. Yet in
doing so, it may have dealt a fatal blow to business conﬁdence, with grave
implications for the long-term prospects of the national economy. The Kim
government’s successor – which includes some of Kim Dae-jung’s senior
ministers, such as Lee Hun-jai – faces the challenge of simultaneously
satisfying the disparate interests of the chaebols, labour and foreign investors.
The revival of a cooperative relationship with chaebol leaders will be crucial
to the economy’s wellbeing.
NOTES
1. In this article ‘Korea’ refers to the Republic of Korea (the ROK or South Korea).
2. This article adopts the Korean government’s ofﬁcial system of Romanisation (Ministry of
Culture and Tourism proclamation 2000–08, http://www.mct.go.kr:8080/english/K_about/
Language04.html). The new system permits the use of terms such as ‘chaebol’ (rather than
‘jaebeol’) – the family-owned conglomerates that have dominated the Korean economy –
since such terms have become widely used in Korean Studies, and to alter their Romanisation
would only create unnecessary confusion.
3. Refer to the article by Mark Beeson and Iyanatul Islam in this volume for a more complete
explanation of the Washington consensus.
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